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I know what you're thinking. It's a phoney-baloney world. The women are 
surgically enhanced, the athletes are on steroids, the singers are lip-syncing if 
they're even singing at all, the news is entertainment, the politicians are bought 
and paid for- we're living one big lie.
— Victor Taransky in S1m0ne (2002)
The Inauthentic, body manipulation, body enhancement, virtuality, infotainment, 
commercial colonisation, simulation – this, as the character Taransky suggests, typifies our 
age. These familiar motifs of the posthuman condition, as well as media surveillance, 
virtual reality, cloning, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, biometrics, drones, and 
so on, feature in the popular films of Andrew Niccol.1 They can be seen to represent and 
express anxiety around the posthuman condition. Niccol wrote The Truman Show (1998) 
and was writer and director of Gattaca (1997), S1m0ne (2002), In Time (2011), and Good Kill 
(2014).  A consideration that links these films is a reflection upon posthuman cinema itself. 
For instance there is the oppressive nature of the posthuman post-cinematic camera as 
hidden surveillance tool in Truman, the notion of posthuman computer-generated 
‘synthespians’ replacing human actors in S1m0ne, and the posthuman post-cinematic 
camera as precision bomber in Good Kill. In this article I suggest that each of the films 
under consideration stages a posthuman problem which is subsequently met with a 
humanist remedy. The films foreground posthuman issues such as media surveillance and 
simulation (The Truman Show), cloning and genetic engineering (Gattaca), virtual reality 
and digital media (S1m0ne), biometrics and neoliberalism (In Time), and mediated war 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (Good Kill). Variants of the humanist solution to these issues 
include an authentic real, a space beyond mediation, an outside of media ecology (The 
Truman Show), a human spirit that is not reducible to materiality (Gattaca), an authentic 
identity, and actual rather than virtual reality (S1m0ne), an innate sense of justice and 
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outside to the flow of neoliberal finance (In Time), and face-to-face rather than screen-to-
screen relationality, and a real war in comparison to a virtual war (Good Kill).
These typically posthuman motifs also concerned the theorist Jean Baudrillard and 
compelled him to critique manifestations of the posthuman condition. Essentially, for 
Baudrillard, the posthuman is inhuman. In this article I discuss the posthuman imagery in 
Niccol’s films with reference to Baudrillard’s reading of the posthuman condition. The 
article begins with a brief discussion and uncoupling of the notions of posthumanism and 
the posthuman. Focus turns to the films of Niccol and inquiry is made upon the positing 
of posthuman problems and humanist solutions. Baudrillard can be seen to complicate 
these humanist solutions by suggesting that the apparent space they point to is always 
already compromised and colonised by the posthuman condition. Niccol’s films can be 
seen to fit into the genre identified by Scott Loren as ‘posthumanist panic cinema.’ 
However, I conclude by suggesting that the construction of this genre needs some 
reconsideration in terms of the identification and function of such a genre.
POSTHUMANISMS AND POSTHUMANS.
How is posthumanism and the posthuman conceived? As in temporal discussions of the 
prefix ‘post’ in postmodernism, poststructuralism, postmarxism, postfeminism, for 
example, the ‘post’ of posthuman, and posthumanism, need not necessarily demarcate a 
complete rupture. Indeed the diverse aims and investigations of posthumanism and the 
posthuman, “renders inoperable any universally accepted definition.”2 There is already 
discussion and positing of a “post-posthuman”3 and a “posthumanism to come,”4 as well 
as the notion that posthumanism “comes both before and after humanism.”5  Neil 
Badmington has suggested caution with the phrase ‘posthumanism,’ labelling it “a 
dubious neologism,” however he allows for its potential to serve as a convenient 
shorthand for a “general crisis” in humanism.6  The ‘post-’ of posthumanism and the 
posthuman need not serve as signalling the absolute end of humanism, or the death of 
man, but instead as indicating a Freudian ‘working through’ of humanism.7
There is much debate on posthumanism and its possibilities. No consensus has been 
reached, and it may therefore be fruitful to speak of posthuman theory, practice, and 
condition not in the singular but in the plural – that is as posthuman conditions.8  If 
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humanism appeals to the notion of a core ‘humanity’ or fixed essential feature to the 
human being, then variants of posthumanism would express some degree of incredulity 
to such a notion. It would be suspicious of humanist belief in an essence to the human 
that would be outside of history, politics, technology, economics, social relations, and so 
on. Following Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, Nietzsche, and the ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ 
of Marx and Engels in ‘The German Ideology’, the human is decentred and the ego “is not 
even master in its own house.”9 A later generation of thinkers, such as Foucault, Lacan, 
Althusser, Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Derrida would, with varying degrees, see humanism 
as an obstacle impeding radical change and the thinking of difference and alterity: “The 
future would begin with the end of Man.”10
In more material terms, contemporary life in an advanced technologically ubiquitous 
society and a media saturated ecology and culture also calls for a crisis in the purported 
autonomous Cartesian subject. This environment troubles traditional humanist 
distinctions between the natural, the human, and the technological: “New technologies 
have complicated the question of what it means to be human.”11 This convergence of 
organisms and technology leads to “the point where they become indistinguishable.”12 
The concern is clear for Francis Fukuyama, contemporary biotechnology “will alter 
human nature and thereby move us into a ‘posthuman’ stage of history.”13 This is not 
without subsequent and qualified objection,14  however technology15, economic power, 
and the human conjoin in much posthuman discussion and ongoing debate.
Posthuman concerns about hybridity and the purity of the human have long been 
prefigured in mythic and literary narratives such as Plato's Phaedrus, Apuleius's Golden 
Ass, Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream, and Keats's Lamia, “in which human 
figures are transformed by formal coupling with the nonhuman into something beyond 
the human.”16 However, the growth and advance of technology, the machine, robotics, 
silicon, cybernetics, digitalisation, and so forth, have upped the ante and accelerated the 
production of the posthuman and consumption of popular narratives around the 
posthuman condition. In the light of recent innovations in robotics, prosthetic 
technologies, neuroscience, nano-technology, biogenetic capital, and so on, the posthuman 
condition “urges us to think critically and creatively about who and what we are actually 
in the process of becoming.”17 One critical line of thought this article considers is the work 
of Jean Baudrillard, and one creative form is the cinema of Andrew Niccol.
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THE TRUMAN SHOW
Baudrillard suggested that ambitions and anxieties around technology and virtual reality 
are an obsession of our age. They are reflected and constructed in popular film18  such as 
The Matrix (1999). He notes that “there have been other films that treat the growing 
indistinction between the real and the virtual: The Truman Show, Minority Report, or even 
Mulholland Drive.”19  It has been claimed that “The Truman Show takes Baudrillard 
seriously.”20 The film famously explores the virtual real, and the simulation of reality. It 
externalises what Blade Runner (1982) internalises. Truman, the first baby to have been 
adopted at birth by a corporation, unknowingly lives on a film-set where five thousand 
cameras carry the events to a television audience. Some of these surveillance cameras are 
inventively hidden in items such as a dog collar, a bathroom mirror, a pencil sharpener, 
buttons, and Truman’s ring. The film satirises our media saturated world and anticipates 
developments in reality television and virtual reality. Baudrillard had anticipated these 
developments in his comments on the documentary series An American Family  (1973), 
which is today considered the first ‘reality’ series on American television. The private is 
made public and “the most intimate operation of your life becomes the potential grazing 
ground of the media….The entire universe also unfolds unnecessarily on your home 
screen.”21 This is how The Truman Show is for its unknowing subject and audience. The 
Orwellian oppression, and society of surveillance that Foucault warned about, is 
experienced by Truman involuntarily. However, today this surveillance appears to have 
become voluntary, indeed a necessity, desire, and demand for the contemporary subject of 
the digital age. Identity has always, in some sense, been performative, but virtual 
technologies amplify and this. Through social media22  subjects both perform in and 
produce their own version of the Truman show. Pace Socrates, “the unscreened life is not 
worth living.”23 This is the participatory panopticon and demonstrates that successful 
Foucauldian governmentality comes about when people can be incentivised to impose 
certain behaviour willingly upon themselves and one another rather than be coerced into 
it. This self-subjugation, or Stockholm syndrome, is one sign of the move from domination 
to hegemony.24
Baudrillard’s 1987 article, ‘We are all Transsexuals Now,’ might just as well been titled, 
‘We are all Posthuman Now.’ Here he anticipates and warns against the posthuman, 
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screened life, self-surveyed, virtual identity that our media ecology and social media 
phenomenon such as Facebook facilitate: 
We no longer have the time to seek out an identity in the historical record, in memory, 
in a past, nor indeed in a project or a future. We have to have an instant memory which 
we can plug in to immediately - a kind of promotional identity which can be verified at 
every moment.25
The upshot here on identity and the formation of the self is that “all that remains is to 
perform an appearing act, without bothering to be, or even to be seen.”26  There is 
movement from ‘I exist, I'm here’ to ‘I'm visible, I'm image.’ Being oneself becomes “an 
ephemeral performance, with no lasting effects, a disenchanted mannerism in a world 
without manners.”27 This precarious self is facilitated by and fully suits the needs of life 
under neoliberalism with the capacity to self-modify at the whim of the fluxes, transfers, 
and exchanges of capital. There is a qualitative loss of human identity in this quantitative 
dissemination of the image of identity. Importantly, socialisation becomes dissociated 
from bodily affective experience, and the exposure to the other remains on the level of the 
virtual.
Sylvia is a young forthright ‘extra’ who seduces - leads-astray - Truman from 
simulation. She is the only character in the show to communicate with Truman in 
relatively free and undistorted speech by deviating from the script. Product placement 
and overt advertising has been incorporated into the actor’s scripts as they communicate 
with Truman. The television audience can buy anything that is seen on screen through the 
Truman Catalog. This product placement and the notion of a ‘promotional identity’ 
represents the migration of advertising and marketing “from separated, regulated spaces 
into the spaces of programs, films, and eventually out of the media and into our lives.”28 
The performance by supporting actors in the film envisions and anticipates the neoliberal 
posthuman as an entrepreneur of their own capital, and as a consumer in a promotional 
culture and marketing society. Once Truman has triumphed and exited from the show the 
cheering audience in the film immediately become bored. “So, what else is on?” asks one, 
about to channel-hop, in the closing lines of the film. And one must assume that really 
existing cinema goers also pondered after The Truman Show, “So, what else is on?”
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Once apparently free, Truman says in defiance to the director, “You didn’t have a 
camera in my head.” One reading of the film has deemed this to be the response of “an 
essential (plucky) humanism, a true nature.”29 However, Baudrillard might disagree with 
Truman’s claim and humanist escape from posthuman horror. He has argued that 
Americans internalise the cinematic apparatus and “experience reality like a tracking shot; 
that’s why they succeed so well with certain media, particularly television.”30 We should 
assume that Truman has internalised television and is part of “an integral telemorphosis 
of society.”31 For Baudrillard, the McLuhanesque notion of technology being an extension 
of the human needs to be reversed and consideration also given to how technologies feed 
back to the human, implode, and transform the human in and through their extension. As 
Sobchack suggests, cinematic and electronic screens differently demand and shape “our 
‘presence’ to the world and our representation in it. Each differently and objectively alters 
our subjectivity while each invites our complicity in formulating space, time, and bodily 
investment as significant personal and social experience.”32 That is to say that interactive 
technologies lead to an increasing ‘biological confusion’ between the human and their 
prostheses, and are a further phase in the electronic colonisation of the senses and our 
“psychasthenic absorption.”33  We might be incredulous then, to The Truman Show’s 
humanist notion of a mental space free from the impact of technology and media ecology. 
It can be suggested that Truman’s ‘freedom’ is actually just the move from one form of 
simulation into another: “he is not leaving the society of control, he merely exits from one 
institution.”34 If the film, as Foley argues, is “better understood as a variation of what is 
arguably The Republic’s most important trope: the Allegory of the Cave,”35 then it should 
be added that Truman merely leaves one cave and enters into another cave.
GATTACA
Gattaca is a sci-fi genetic engineering, biopolitcal dystopia which foregrounds anxiety 
around ‘the not-too-distant future’ possibility of cloning and eugenics in the form of 
conceiving ‘improved’ children by genetic manipulation. The posthuman conflict and 
dilemma is set up from the very opening of the film with two contrasting quotes. The first 
is from Ecclesiastes 7: 13, “Consider God’s handiwork: who can straighten what He hath 
made crooked?” The second is by Dr Willard Gaylin from an essay published in 1983 
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titled ‘What’s So Special About Being Human?’: “I not only think that we will tamper with 
Mother Nature, I think Mother Nature wants us to.” The film foregrounds future 
possibilities of epidemiological surveillance whereby genetic tampering is so 
commonplace that ‘potentially prejudicial conditions’ are eliminated. These include 
alcoholism, premature baldness, myopia, obesity, and a propensity to violence. In the 
original epilogue to the film, not included in the final cut, the films thematic foundation is 
restated: 
In a few short years, scientists will have completed the Human Genome Project, the 
mapping of all the genes that make up a human being. After 4 billion years of 
evolution by the slow and clumsy method of natural selection, we have now evolved 
to the point where we can direct our own evolution. If only we had acquired this 
knowledge sooner, the following people would never have been born: Homer, Blind 
from birth; Napoleon Bonaparte, Epileptic; Colette, Arthritic; Lou Gerhig, Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis (Lou Gerhig’s Disease); Rita Hayworth, Alzheimer’s Disease; Helen 
Keller, Blind and Death; Stephen Hawking, Lou Gerhig’s Disease; Jackie Joyner-Kersee, 
Asthmatic; Charles Darwin, Chronic invalid.
Two final sentences conclude the epilogue: “Even Charles Darwin, the man who told of 
the survival of the fittest, numbered amongst our frailest. Of course, the other birth that 
would surely never have taken place is your own.”36
The film’s title is based on the first letters of guanine, adenine, thymine, and cytosine, 
the four nucleobases of DNA. The film can be seen to pose ethical questions around 
biological materialism and the concept of the human and genetic determinism. It explores 
the use of biometrics to construct the ideal human and the elimination of otherness by 
way of the eradication of ‘in-valids’ – or as they are also called in the film, ‘de–gene–
erates’ - susceptible to genetic ‘disorders’. This is the cognitive and nanotechnological-
neurological future. The advertising strapline of the film indicates where it sits in the 
posthuman debate: ‘There is no gene for the human spirit.’
Baudrillard’s disquiet with proto-cloning and the project of cloning and genetic 
manipulation is that, counter intuitively, on the pretext of immortality humanity may well 
be moving towards a slow extermination. “Human beings can’t bear themselves, they 
can’t bear their otherness, this duality.”37 For Baudrillard, the desire and ambition behind 
CINEMA 7 · BALDWIN! 92
cloning is actually the eradication of all ambiguity and radical otherness from the human. 
This is part of what Baudrillard has identified as the process of simulation. The 
ambiguous and enigmatic real is eradicated and superseded by the copy and the clone. In 
this sense Baudrillard can posit that cloning signals the move from human to posthuman, 
and is actually “an enterprise of self-immolation by technology,” which leads humanity 
into “the future primitive society of the digital.”38
S1M0NE
S1m0ne is self-reflective upon film making processes and the possibilities of film and 
virtual reality. Al Pacino plays Viktor Taransky, a washed up film director. Taransky has 
become disillusioned with film making after having difficulties with the star of his new 
film. The actress is a demanding diva, eternally late, and eventually walks out of the film. 
Upon hearing this threat to the completion of the film, Taransky visited by a ‘mad 
professor’ type. In a representation of posthuman film-theory, the professor reminds 
Taransky that they previously met at ‘The Future of Film conference’ in San Jose. “I was 
keynote speaker. You must remember my speech, ‘Who Needs Humans?’” Viktor faintly 
recognises this: “That's right. You were booed off the stage.” Who does need humans 
however, when, as the professor claims, he has a computer program which can create 
‘synthespians’. These are virtual actors called ‘vactors’. Viktor protests: “I need flesh.” 
“Flesh is weak”, the professor replies. The trope of the posthuman is made apparent 
insofar as the messiness, unpredictability, and uniqueness of the human actress can 
seemingly be replaced by the perfect, ordered, controllable posthuman virtual actress. 
This is a simulated clone with all otherness eradicated.
Taransky can now use a computer-generated ‘synthespian’ to replace the movie's 
leading actress. The program is titled Simulation One, which is shortened and combined 
to name the virtual actress Simone. In the film title there is the use of the 1 and 0 of binary 
code to result in ‘S1m0ne’. Here Simone is without origin, reality, or index. As with virtual 
images produced by digital visual technologies there are no real-life referents. The virtual 
actress is deemed by critics and the public to give a flawless performance in the film and 
more is demanded. Tanansky duly obliges, marketing her as a real person, and 
subsequent performances result in an Academy Award for Best Actress. She appears in 
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simulated interviews and as a hologram in a stadium performance. The machinery of 
celebrity celebration goes into spin without a real celebrity. Developments around the 
posthuman and technology are entwined with the political economy of Hollywood. 
Viktor exclaims, “See beyond that irrational allegiance to flesh and blood. See that with 
the rise in price of a real actor and the fall in price of a fake, the scales have tipped in 
favour of the fake.”
The key piece of dialogue of the film, in terms of exemplifying anxiety around virtual 
reality, may be when Viktor excitedly says to Simone, “Do you have any idea what this 
means, Simone?  Our ability to manufacture fraud now exceeds our ability to detect it.” 
Simone replies, “I am the death of real.” With caution, this could be considered 
Baudrillard’s thesis in a nutshell. If virtual reality could speak it would say precisely this: 
‘I am the death of real.’ Baudrillard’s theoretical target is hyper-reality, simulation, and the 
virtual – manifestations of the semiotic - which reduces the symbolic and thwarts 
experience of the real. Self-referential sign systems, or simulation, obscures the symbolic 
and replaces the real. Baudrillard’s concept of the symbolic resonates with the Lacanian 
Real, and what he often targets as ‘reality’ is largely equivalent with the Lacanian 
symbolic. In this sense, the ‘real’ is just as much a form of simulation as the hyper-real. 
The fundamental distinction is not between the real and the virtual, “but between the 
symbolic and the successive attempts to neutralise it – the real, the hyper-real and the 
virtual.”39  Digital media and virtual reality inform Baudrillard’s notion of simulation 
insofar as the virtual is the ‘fourth order’ or highest stage of simulation. It is without 
origin, referent, index, or representation of the real. It is a semiotic system divorced from 
the real and is self-referential or hyper-real. The hyper-real comes to dictate matters, and 
finally the map does indeed precede the territory. For Baudrillard, the universe of 
simulation aims at “a virtual universe from which everything dangerous and negative has 
been expelled.”40 This distances one from the possibility of symbolic exchange, radical 
alterity, and duality. 
Characteristics of Baudrillard’s conception of the virtual include high definition, high 
fidelity, immersion, immanence, and immediacy.41  This is distinct to the notion of the 
spectacle, which still left room for a possible critical consciousness and demystification.42 
Previously the virtual was intended to become actual, and actuality was its destination. 
However, today the function of the virtual is to proscribe the actual.43 Indeed the virtual 
dimension monopolises all the other worlds today, and totalises the real by evacuating 
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any imaginary alternative.44  With the virtual we enter not only upon the era of the 
liquidation of the real and the referential, but that of the extermination of the other.45 
Baudrillard’s critique of the virtual is based upon this loss of the symbolic, the imaginary, 
and alterity. In posthuman-technology relations, individuals have become “terminals of 
multiple networks.”46 In this scenario, the posthuman is becoming the virtual reality of 
the machine, and at a certain level of immersion in the machinery of the virtual, the man/
machine distinction no longer exists.47 We are no longer actors of the real, but double 
agents of the virtual. The posthuman emerges as a prosthesis, an addition and application, 
to digital technology and the virtual. Generations steeped in the virtual, Baudrillard 
claims, will never have known the real.48 In essence: “The human gives way to the post-
human when the virtual replaces the actual as the primary mode by which we 
conceptualise and experience reality.”49
One further core exchange in S1m0ne happens during an interview with Simone on a 
screen in a television studio. The interviewer asks the screen, “Who are you really?” 
Simone replies, “That's a good question. As Nietzsche said, ‘Whenever a man strives long 
and hard to appear someone else, he ends up finding it is difficult to be himself again.’” 
This warning, albeit blunt, is the cautionary tale of the film, and the warning about the 
virtual. By immersing ourselves in the virtual and the digital, by becoming posthuman 
and inhuman, we may not finally find our way back to the real and back to the human. 
The allusion of Viktor Taransky to Victor Frankenstein is signposted, and the film, 
likewise, is a cautionary tale on science and technology. Originally Frankenstein 
harnessed the then new technology of electricity to create his ‘monster’, and Shelley’s 
novel expresses anxiety about science and technology. Taransky harnesses technologies of 
the virtual in his creation, and the film expresses anxiety about new technologies of the 
virtual.
IN TIME
In Time is a sci-fi genetic engineering dystopia. It has been suggested that the film offers “a 
post-apocalyptic vision of a world that both is and is not recognisably our own.”50 The 
dystopia is an extrapolation and exacerbation of our world and denotes the apparent 
collapse of a coherent response to capitalism. In the film when someone turns twenty-five 
CINEMA 7 · BALDWIN! 95
years old they stop aging. They are engineered to live only one further year, when they 
will ‘time-out’ and die. However, in a mirror of neoliberal economic inequality, this 
engineered time can be bought and sold. The rich attain decades at a time while the poor 
beg borrow or steal just enough hours to make it through another day. As a time-rich 
character states, “For a few to be immortal, many must die” – the neoliberal analogy is the 
‘for a few to be rich, many must be poor.’ Nicky Marsh has claimed that the film 
reimagines “the meaning of the biopolitical time of debt in the shadow of the [2008 
financial] crisis.”51 The protagonist of In Time becomes a Robin Hood figure, attempting to 
actualise justice by slipping outside the flows of finance, and robbing from the rich to give 
to the poor.
In Time plays with the fantasy of mastering and ordering time, and treads the same 
ground as recent films such as and Inception (2010), Source Code (2011) and Looper (2012). 
These films, and one would add others from The Terminator (1984) to Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind (2004) and most recently Interstellar (2014), have been termed ‘Mind-Game’ 
films engendering their “own loops or Möbius strips.”52 This abstraction, displacement, 
reorganisation and playing with the apparent plasticity and possible compression of time 
and space is seen as an expression of the alienation of post-Fordist work and time. Franco 
‘Bifo’ Berardi, influenced by Baudrillard’s notion of semiocapital, argues that the 
transformation induced by the neoliberal digitalisation of the labour process leads to the 
fragmentation of the personal continuity of work, and the fractalisation and 
cellularisation of time: “The worker disappears as a person, and is replaced by abstract 
fragments of time.”53 The film provides a vision of this scenario. In In Time time becomes a 
universal currency - ‘time is money’ – and can extend youth and provide a form of 
immortality. This is the posthuman and cryogenic fantasy of immortality. It is an attempt 
to eradicate the ambiguity and singularity of death, and eradicate the ambiguity and 
singularity of the human, all too human.
GOOD KILL
Good Kill explores the situation whereby a U.S. drone pilot could “commute to work in 
rush-hour traffic, slip into a seat in front of a bank of computers, ‘fly’ a warplane to shoot 
missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from school or a 
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gallon of milk at the grocery store on his way home for dinner.”54 The film opens by 
inviting the viewer to assume they are seeing a real bombing mission only to track back 
and reveal a scene reminiscent of a 1990s internet café. The film utilises actual footage of 
drone strikes obtained from Wikileaks. Gregoire Chamayou has suggested that the ‘best 
definition’ of drones is “flying, high-resolution video cameras armed with missiles.”55 
This is a movie camera without a man and signals posthuman cinema at the level of form 
as well as content56. The drone is a McLuhanesque extension of man’s fist and eye: “Their 
history is that of an eye turned into a weapon.”57 In principle the drone, like much 
posthuman technology, can be employed progressively. However, whilst countless 
military drones have killed countless people, and its commercial potential is being 
exploited, the drone as a humanitarian tool delivering medical supplies, for instance, 
remains at time of writing, a fiction, as only an “optimistically rendered Photoshop 
image.”58 Drones are what Braidotti would term a ‘necro-technology’59 operated by “tele-
thanatological warriors.”60  Further, “[c]ontemporary death-technologies are posthuman 
because of the intense technological mediation within which they operate.”61 Good Kill 
poses the possibilities that Judith Butler has remarked upon. Intuitively we may think that 
persons wage war, not the instruments they deploy: “But what happens if the instruments 
acquire their own agency, such that persons become extensions of those instruments?”62 
This is the posthuman reversal of man becoming a prosthesis to technology. Butler adds, 
“persons use technological instruments, but instruments surely also use persons (position 
them, endow them with perspective, and establish the trajectory of their actions).”63
The lead character of Good Kill - Major Thomas Egan – lives and works in Las Vegas 
whilst killing and maiming in Afghanistan. Mediated technologies might liberate him 
from certain constraints of space and time but they also confine him to a screen and non-
place. He experiences becoming a posthuman prosthesis to military technology, and this 
militarised (and masculine) posthuman cyborg warrior is in contrast with the optimistic 
possibilities of the posthuman cyborg enthused by Donna Haraway. Egan is a former 
traditional pilot who, on a ‘nonvoluntary basis,’ has become a drone pilot. He laments 
how the U.S. Air Force has become the “U.S. Chair Force.” Indeed, by 2012, the US Air 
Force was training, via computer simulations, more drone pilots than fighter and bomber 
pilots combined. Whilst downing vodka, Egan begins to question this posthuman 
condition and the ethics and effectiveness of the drone64. He sinks into indifference, 
depression, and fatigue. The major dilemma, posed in the film to Egan by this virtual war, 
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is signalled in the advertising strapline to the film: “If you never face your enemy how can 
you face yourself?” This makes apparent that Egan’s distress is deemed to come from 
mediated digitised screen relations that disrupt face-to-face relations. Egan is a veteran of 
six tours in a fighter jet and want to return to the actual “theatre of operation.” His 
hardened commander declares that, “War is now a first-person shooter.” “I am a pilot and 
I’m not flying,” Egan bemoans. “Every day I feel like a coward taking a pot-shot at 
someone half way around the world.” The drama Egan both creates and suffers in his 
home life - he becomes impotent - allows inclusion of the film into the genre identified by 
Wiegman as “missiles and melodrama.”65 We might also read into Egan’s dilemma a 
mourning of the lost phallic potential of the drone, whereby mastery of mediated 
technology replaces immediate military dominance in the field.
The film’s atmosphere, like the Las Vegas military cube, is airless and banal. The 
viewer is likely to become as bored and indifferent as Egan as they repeatedly view grainy 
shots of tiny figures scuttling followed by explosion and dust. The drone operators staring 
at multiple screens are analogous to the financial traders described by Tom Wolfe: “trying 
to monitor six screens at once, six screens that fan out three over three, obscuring any 
connection we have to the real world.”66 Indeed, the drone operator and the financial 
trader are emblematic figures of the posthuman condition. Both are cut off from the ‘real 
world’ effects of their operations and this mediation desensitises them from their actions. 
The drone missile kills or injures in several ways, including through incineration, 
shrapnel, and the release of powerful blast waves capable of crushing internal organs67. 
Likewise, financial operations in the hyper-real economy68 remove the trader from the 
effects their virtual labour such as precarious employment, exploitation, austerity, 
inequality, environmental damage, hardship, poverty, and so forth. If for the Afghanistan, 
“[t]he buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder of imminent death,”69 then for 
many in the West, it is debt that functions as a drone in terms of the constant reminder of 
the psychic imprisonment of permanent surveillance and financial obedience.
In mediated war the alleged enemy now apparently resides in ‘compounds’ rather than 
‘homes.’ They turn from being seen as real flesh and are instead rendered posthuman and 
deemed to be a legitimate target or not based on adherence or deviation from simulation 
models. These are ‘pattern of life’ indicators and there is a reliance on ‘quantitative data’ 
to determine the possibility of a ‘signature strike.’70  This is algorithmic regulation of 
behaviour: deviate from your normal pattern of everyday life – deviate from the 
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simulation model – and you will be suspect. Should one show ‘suspicious’ behaviour, and 
the supposed ‘signature’ of a terrorist, or merely be near someone who does, then one will 
be defined as a terrorist and targeted. The definition of the terrorist precedes the war act 
and hence produces the alleged ‘clean’ nature of drone strikes and supposed lack of 
collateral damage and civilian causalities. This is how, in virtual war, the model precedes 
and dictates the real. This loss of the human is precisely the threat that virtual posthuman 
war poses. The digital dimension of the drone must be emphasised: “The precision 
bomber as ‘posthuman’ suggests that both bomber and the people on his or her screen are 
flows of information on a screen – existing as texts or codes.”71 Indeed this is the basis 
upon which Lauren Wilcox would challenge the drone. The production of certain subjects 
through their integration in informational frameworks constituted by the practices of 
precision warfare suggests, “that a greater emphasis on ‘seeing’ the victims of warfare is 
not an adequate critique: it is the ‘coding’ of such people that matters.”72
“If you never face your enemy how can you face yourself?” As the strapline implies, 
Egan’s war has no face, no place, and no time. Or rather this is posthuman anonymous 
war, infinite war, and global war against ‘terror.’ Egan’s nostalgic Levinasian appeal to 
face-to-face relations, or to Baudrillardian relations of duality, reveal how vacuous virtual 
mediated war (and peace) has become. The problems experienced with the virtual feed 
back into relations with his wife and children. Yet Egan’s remedy – to return to the 
“theatre of operation” is bad faith and disingenuous. The ‘real’ war that Egan wants to 
return to – presumably Iraq 2004 – was, as Baudrillard has suggested of the Gulf War 
1991, always already virtual. Baudrillard, notoriously for some, had suggested that the 
Gulf War differed from, and altered the traditional ontology of war. The war was not a 
real contest but a virtual war - a mediated demonstration of the West’s technological and 
political dominance and the globalisation of its commercial interests. War turns into ‘war-
processing’ and drifts into rationalisation and technicalisation. Like the drone seeking 
deviation from simulation models of ‘normal’ behaviour, force is not directed against real 
adversaries, but against abstract operations and definitions. Warfare has been supplanted 
for the model of warfare. As James Der Derian has suggested, the virtual revolution in 
war “is driven more by software than hardware, and enabled by networks rather than 
agents.”73 There are digital ‘warriors’ in films and video game simulations on the one 
hand, and real-time broadcasting and TV images of ‘real war’ suffering on the other. Both 
are mediated directly into the living room and condition and reconcile us to, as 
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Baudrillard had anticipated, the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment complex. The 
Gulf War was not a war, it was “war stripped of its passions, it violence, by its technicians, 
and then reclothed by them with all the artifices of electronics.”74 This virtual war revised 
the notion that “war is born of an antagonistic, destructive but dual relation between two 
adversaries.”75  The Gulf War was conducted in part as a media spectacle. It is this 
unilateral, virtual war, which Egan paradoxically mourns and regards as a real war, with 
dual relations, which would restore his actuality, masculinity, power, and presence. 
POSTHUMANIST PANIC CINEMA?
Scott Loren76 has attempted to derive and define the genre of ‘posthumanist panic cinema’ 
with a consideration of films such as 2001 A Space Odyssey (1968), Alien (1979), Blade 
Runner (1982), eXistenZ (1999), Fight Club (1999), Vanilla Sky (2001),  Minority Report (2002), 
and concluding with The Island (2005). The genre is deemed a “millennial disease,”77 and 
might be “conceived of as cinema that stages some form of threat to the liberal humanist 
subjects authenticity.”78 What is posthumanist panic cinema?  “The term should indicate 
both cinema that depicts representations of the posthuman and threat to humanist 
philosophies and ideologies.”79 As this definition makes clear the level of analysis remains 
upon content rather than form80. It is ‘reactionary’ to philosophies of the posthuman, and 
tends to be positioned “anxiously in relations to logics of posthumanism and nostalgically, 
even desperately, in relation to tenets of humanism.”81 It is “not interested in decentring 
the human, nor in doing away with humanism. The dominant story has rather been one 
of anxiety regarding form of decentring.”82  It addresses itself “to the viewer-subject’s 
latent knowledge of its own decentrement.”83  Apparently, this allows a “psychical 
working out”84  of collective preoccupations about authenticity, agency, individualism, 
technology, subjectivity, social formations, locations of power, and so forth. 
The films of Niccol function in such a way and could fit into such a genre definition. 
However they also indicate why Loren’s definition would need elaboration. Panic, in 
Loren, is deemed to be panic about the human becoming decentred or hybrid in some 
sense – rather than the form this decentrement or hybridity may actually take. That is to 
say that there does not seem to be the necessary decoupling of (philosophical) 
posthumanism and the (technological) posthuman. Niccol’s films express anxiety about 
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both of these processes. Loren’s definition is insightful and useful but certain notions in 
his definition such as ‘disease’, ‘reactionary’, ‘nostalgic’, ‘desperate’, and ‘anxiously’ are 
concerning. Witness the notion that “posthuman cinema is alive, but not well – at least 
from a posthumanist perspective.”85 Implicit here is that things are ‘not well’ because the 
human subject is not reconciling itself to the decentred, hybrid, posthuman condition. It 
seems that Loren is implying that some form of certainty, or mastery, over the aporias of 
posthumanism can be obtained. The panicked human does not cohere with the readings 
of the posthuman condition as having potential for the human, and as the negative 
connotations imply, Loren seems to see this as bad faith or even a hysterical condition that 
requires ‘psychical working out’. This notion then, disregards the more critical and 
disturbing visions of the convergence of posthumanist decentring, deterritorialisation, 
precarity, mediation, and flexibility, with the demands of the emergent neoliberal norm. 
For instance, Braidotti’s notion of the potential presented by the posthuman offers a form 
of ‘techno-happy,’ ‘techno-salvation.’86  But this disavowals that it emerges from a 
“position of considerable privilege” and more importantly it repeats the myth of “the 
humanist European project as a truly emancipatory affair.”87
Loren does not pursue the etymology of panic but in this context I find it significant 
that we get the word from the Greek god Pan. He was a half-man and half-goat, who was 
said to have scared and scattered the Persians when he appeared on the side of the 
Athenians in the Battle of Marathon. The adjective panikos (noun panikon) was used to 
describe an extreme sense of fear in an individual or a collective. Pan was both sacred and 
profane, a god and a man-goat. I find it insightful that so clearly an originary hybrid 
making undecidable the boundaries of the human and animal resonates with 
contemporary fears of the posthuman condition. This suggests that the ‘psychical working 
out’ of Loren’s posthuman panic may take some time. Finally, in comparison to 
posthuman panic being seen problematically and worked out to a degree of satisfaction 
that enables the subject to function smoothly within the neoliberal flows of control, 
finance, and media, the panic could be considered more radical and possibly inventive in 
a way reminiscent of the slogan from Deleuze and Guattari: “Panic is creation.”88
In Good Kill, the humanist solution and ambition to escape to a real war, from a virtual 
war, mirrors Truman’s escape from an oppressive virtual media ecology, and Taransky’s 
escape from simulation, and the attempted escape from biopower in Gattaca, and the 
flows of neoliberal finance in In Time. I have suggested that each of Niccol’s films, 
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exemplary products of posthuman cinema, foreground a posthuman dilemma and that 
the remedy to this is to be found in the attempt to return to an earlier untainted version of 
the human. Issues such as media surveillance and simulation (Truman) are to be solved 
with an apparently authentic real, a space beyond mediation, and an outside of media 
ecology. Cloning and genetic engineering (Gattaca) are to be faced with a notion of the 
human spirit that is not reducible to materiality. Virtual reality and digital media (S1m0ne) 
can be countered with an authentic identity, and actual rather than virtual reality. Despite 
biometrics and neoliberalism (In Time) there is still the possibility of stepping outside the 
flow of biopower and finance. Mediated war and unmanned aerial vehicles (Good Kill) can 
be opposed by face-to-face, rather than screen-to-screen, relationality, and actual war 
rather than virtual war. However, Baudrillard’s work ups the ante of these dystopian 
visions of the posthuman future by suggesting that any escape is going to be foiled and 
merely signals the move from one simulation or virtual realm to another. That is to say 
that the spaces and places of humanist return are, in Baudrillard, now compromised and 
colonised by the posthuman. The humanist remedy is a fantasy and is something we no 
longer have recourse to because the human is now posthuman. “The loss of (spontaneous, 
reciprocal, symbolic) human relations is the fundamental fact of our societies,”89 
Baudrillard claims, utilising the radical anthropology of Durkheim, Mauss, and Bataille.90 
These spontaneous, reciprocal, symbolic, human (but not humanist) relations have been 
eroded by simulation, proto-cloning, virtual reality, digital media, semiocapital, and so on. 
The posthuman condition here, is one of subjugation, often self-subjugation, to 
surveillance, biopower, virtuality, neoliberalism, and the drone. This posthuman, closed 
off from radical alterity, suffers an eternity of the same – like the eternal torture of 
Prometheus - and is, in effect, rendered inhuman. The future deserves better.
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1 Andrew Niccol was born in 1964 in New Zealand and began his career directing television commercials. 
He subsequently developed the Oscar nominated script for The Truman Show  but was considered too 
inexperienced to direct it himself. In an interesting twist, he later married Rachel Roberts the actress who 
plays the virtual real Simone in S1m0ne. As well as the five films considered here Niccol produced The 
Terminal (2004), directed by Stephen Spielberg, wrote and produced Lord of War (2005), and adapted 
Stephenie Meyer’s novel, The Host (2013). The Terminal  is based on the true story of a refugee trapped in an 
airport terminal for nearly two decades when he is denied entry to the host country. This might be seen as 
the stateless posthuman refugee who cannot stay but also cannot leave what Marc Augé would call a  generic, 
transient, ‘non-place.’ The airport serves as the consumer society and American mall in microcosm: “There’s 
only one thing you can do,” says the man in control of immigration, “Shop.” Lord of War features an arms 
dealer who distributes weapons so that major governments can deny involvement. The film opens with the
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construction of a 7.62x39mm cartridge for an AK-47 in a  Soviet Union weapons factory, set to the Buffalo 
Springfield protest song For What It’s Worth. The cartridge is shipped to Africa  and fired into the head of a 
child soldier. This is a  noble critique of illegal arms dealing and trafficking, whereby arms are the consummate 
commodity of the neoliberal, post-border, posthuman age, and can be sold to both sides of a  conflict. An 
onscreen postscript informs the viewer that private arms dealers account for less business than the United 
States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China - the five largest arms exporters and, ironically, the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council charged with the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The Host was a poorly received teenage-romance, sci-fi tale of the classic posthuman motif 
of the human race being taken over by small parasitic aliens. A pocket of unassimilated humans lead the small 
but successful resistance.
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80  By concentrating on content Loren perhaps misses how the form can mitigate against competent 
‘working out’. As Baudrillard would suggest, technology as an extension of man comes back into and informs, 
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